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FOREWORD
Anthony W. Batts
Public safety is of paramount importance in creating healthy communities. Because of the work of
countless law enforcement professionals, crime today is down to a level not seen since the 1960s. In the
last 25 years, violent and property crime has declined almost 50 percent.
Yet along with this crime reduction have come inadvertent and costly consequences. Since 1990, the
United States increased its incarcerated population by 61 percent. There are now 2.3 million Americans
behind bars. If current trends persist, one in three African American men born today will be incarcerated in
his lifetime. Not only do we live in an era of reduced crime, we also live in an era of excessive incarceration.
We lock up too many — especially people of color — for too long, without a clear public safety rationale.
Over incarceration and racially disparate law enforcement are counterproductive to the goal of improving
public safety. These policies call into question the legitimacy of the justice system. In Baltimore City, and in
many urban minority communities, there is an inherent mistrust of people who wear police uniforms. By
reversing these trends, we can actually better protect and serve our communities. Key reforms will restore
the public’s trust in government. Rebuilding trust will increase the likelihood that citizens will work with
law enforcement — police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials — to keep our neighborhoods safe
and vibrant.
Since beginning my career as a police officer over three decades ago, I have witnessed various changes
in our field: from the dramatic decrease in crime, to a concentration on crime prevention, to today’s
new focus on reducing incarceration and racial disparities while preserving public safety. How we police
— and whom we police — is the subject of an important national conversation. A crucial part of this
analysis is the role of race in our justice system.
My experiences growing up a young black kid in South Central Los Angeles inform my view on this
vital topic. I remember asking my mother whether any of our leaders cared about the black kids dying
in our streets. My mother encouraged me to be a change agent. I have dedicated my career to that goal.
How can we move forward to break harmful trends and reinforce beneficial ones? How can we keep our
country safe while reducing incarceration and racial injustices in our system?
We can do what works. We can learn from successes based on tested innovations. We can improve
our policies, practices, and every day decisions. In everything from policing to pretrial detention to
prosecution to probation and parole, modern data-driven techniques can reduce crime without overrelying on incarceration. These techniques can also reduce racial disparities.
This report provides recommendations to reduce racial disparities in jails. It provides local actors with
a roadmap to modernize how we enforce criminal laws. We can and should move away from selective
enforcement and harsh punishment — which research tells us does not work — toward a system that
is more effective and just. This important report provides a path to that goal.
Batts is the Police Commissioner for the City of Baltimore. He previously served as Chief of Police for
Oakland and Long Beach, California.
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LETTER FROM THE DIRECTORS
Inimai Chettiar & Nicole Austin-Hillery
As we work to reduce racially disparate outcomes in our criminal justice system, we face two challenges.
First, we must find a way to reduce racial disparities in the justice system without creating unnecessary
polarization. Second, we must move beyond merely discussing the problem to firmly focus on solutions.
This report seeks to advance both these goals.
Recent controversies in Ferguson, Mo., Staten Island, N.Y., North Charleston, S.C., and Baltimore,
Md., have reopened a national conversation on race, crime, and punishment. As we grapple with these
issues, we must remember one critical point: The goals of increasing public safety, decreasing overreliance
on incarceration, and decreasing racial disparities are not in tension. Research and experience have
shown that we can do all three. Many leaders in law enforcement and corrections believe this as well.
In this report, we called upon the experts who oversee criminal justice every day — police, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges, sheriffs, and corrections heads — to work with community leaders, advocates,
and researchers to devise solutions. Through a Roundtable discussion held in October 2014, we asked
these experts to propose changes to local practices that would lead to a reduction in racial and ethnic
disparities reflected in the country’s jail population. Jails — as opposed to prisons — are largely a
local function. They house individuals who have been arrested, those awaiting trial, and those serving
sentences for low-level offenses. While participants recognized the need to change laws to achieve
change in the system, the recommendations in this report focus on ways in which local actors can alter
outcomes without legal changes.
Based on the conversations and ideas generated by the Roundtable, this report sets forth concrete
recommendations. We hope they prove valuable to practitioners, policymakers, and advocates.
Chettiar is Director of the Brennan Center’s Justice Program. Austin-Hillery is Director and Counsel of the
Brennan Center’s Washington, D.C. Office.
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Roundtable Participants
On October 21-22, 2014, the Brennan Center hosted Racial and Ethnic Disparities in American Jails:
A Roundtable Discussion, bringing together leading law enforcement, corrections officials, judges,
practitioners, researchers, scholars, and advocates.
During the Roundtable, experts discussed a variety of topics related to reducing racial disparities in
the criminal justice system, including which reforms have worked to reduce disparities, how reducing
racial disparities could be measured, and what reforms could achieve these goals. Participants focused
on reforms to be implemented at the local level through changes to practices and decision making
(instead of legal changes) to reduce racial disparities reflected in locally run jails (instead of federal and
state prisons).
The authors’ recommendations are based on ideas generated by the Roundtable discussions.
While the report draws on statements by Roundtable participants to demonstrate the high impact
these recommendations could have on reducing incarceration and racial disparities in jails, the
recommendations of this report should not necessarily be ascribed to any individual participant.
Experts participating in the Roundtable included:
•

Nicole Austin-Hillery, Washington, D.C. Office Director, Brennan Center for Justice.

•

Mario Barnes, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University of California,
Irvine School of Law.

•

Diane Beer-Maxwell, Program Manager, International Association of Chiefs of Police.

•

Spike Bradford, Director of Communications, Pretrial Justice Institute.

•

Paul Butler, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; former federal prosecutor.

•

Juan Cartagena, President and General Counsel, LatinoJustice PRLDEF.

•

Inimai Chettiar, Justice Program Director, Brennan Center for Justice.

•

Michaela Davis, Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Attorney, ACLU of Northern California.

•

Cristine DeBerry, Chief of Staff, Office of District Attorney George Gascón, City and County
of San Francisco.

•

Cynthia Figueroa, President and CEO, Congreso de Latinos Unidos.

•

Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Research Analyst, The Sentencing Project.
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•

Greg Hamilton, Sheriff, Travis County, Texas.

•

Alan Jenkins, Executive Director, Opportunity Agenda.

•

Cynthia Jones, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.

•

Tracie Keesee, Director of Research Partnerships, Center for Policing Equity; Project Director,
Department of Justice National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice Network for Safe Communities; retired Captain, Denver Police
Department.

•

David LaBahn, President & CEO, Association of Prosecuting Attorneys; former Director,
American Prosecutors Research Institute; former Director of Research and Development,
National District Attorneys Association; former Deputy District Attorney, Orange and
Humboldt Counties, California.

•

Clinton Lacey, Director of the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services, former Deputy Commissioner, Department of Probation, City of New York.

•

Marc Levin, Policy Director, Right on Crime; Director, Center for Effective Justice, Texas
Public Policy Foundation.

•

Glenn Martin, President, JustLeadership USA; former Vice President, Fortune Society.

•

Marc Mauer, Executive Director, The Sentencing Project.

•

Jerome McElroy, Executive Director, New York City Pretrial Justice Agency.

•

Rick Raemisch, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections.

•

Norman Reimer, Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
former criminal defense attorney, Gould Reimer Walsh Goffin Cohn LLP.

•

Hon. Louis Trosch, Jr., District Court Judge, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.

•

Nicholas Turner, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice.

•

Arthur Wallenstein, Director, Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Montgomery
County, Maryland.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From October 21-22, 2014, the Brennan Center for Justice and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation convened a group of 25 criminal justice leaders — prosecutors, police, correctional officers,
sheriffs, defense attorneys, community advocates, and researchers — at New York University School
of Law for a series of discussions on racial disparities in local jails. Our goal for the two days: identify
changes in local practices to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in jails, while alleviating unnecessary
incarceration and maintaining public safety.
People of color are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Race, whether consciously or
unconsciously, affects every discretionary point in the criminal justice system. Even race-neutral policies
can yield differential treatment and outcomes. These disparate outcomes are commonly referred to as
“racial and ethnic disparities.” While some crimes are disproportionately committed by certain races,
which can produce some racial imbalances, this report seeks to reduce unjustified disparities in jails.
Why focus on jails? Much attention has been given to racial disparities in our nation’s prisons, but
they have not been fully examined in jails. “Jails” are city or county-level incarceration facilities. Unlike
state prisons, which hold people convicted of crimes and serving longer sentences, jails primarily hold
people awaiting trial and serving short sentences for low-level offenses. Jails provide a gateway to deeper
entanglement in the criminal justice system. Often, decisions made before a defendant arrives at the
jailhouse door — by police, prosecutors, judges, or others– result in the racial disparities that are
eventually reflected in jails. These disparities in turn help create racial disparities throughout the rest of
the criminal justice system.
Roundtable participants identified the following drivers of racial and ethnic disparities in local systems:
•

Treatment of Low-Level Offenses: African Americans are almost four times more likely to be
arrested for selling drugs and almost three times more likely to be arrested for possessing drugs,
even though whites are more likely to sell drugs and equally likely to consume them. Research
from various jurisdictions indicates that African Americans are also more likely to receive jail
sentences when convicted of low-level offenses.

•

Overuse of Pre-Trial Detention: Studies consistently find that African American and Hispanic
defendants are more than twice as likely to be detained in jail pending trial. Research indicates
that pretrial detention significantly increases the likelihood that a defendant will be sentenced
to incarceration after trial and for longer periods of time.

•

Parole and Probation Lengths and Revocations: African Americans and Hispanics remain on
probation and parole longer than similarly situated white offenders. The longer the supervision
term, the higher the chance of committing a low-level, technical violation of conditions and
ending up back in jail. Longer supervision also decreases an individual’s ability to lead his or
her life, including securing employment and housing. Failure to reintegrate successfully into
society increases the likelihood of recidivism, which often results in re-incarceration.
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•

Perverse Financial Incentives: Throughout the criminal justice system, financial incentives are
embedded in funding structures. They often directly or inadvertently encourage an increase in
the number of arrests, pretrial detentions, prosecutions, convictions, or sentences. Too often,
this is how “success” is measured in criminal justice.

•

Collection of Fees and Fines: The collection of court costs and other financial obligations from defendants
disproportionately burdens African Americans and Hispanics who cannot pay. Aggressive collection
practices result in onerous and compounding debt, and even jail stays, for many defendants.

•

Unconscious Bias: Everyone has unconscious and unintentional biases that affect their
understandings and actions. These biases may affect the decisions of criminal justice actors
without their awareness, and result in racial and ethnic disparities.

This report identifies changes to local practice to reduce these disparities while protecting public safety.
Why focus on localities? Though Roundtable participants universally agreed that reforms to federal,
state, and local laws are necessary, they also agreed that changing the daily practices and decisions made
at the local level — by police, prosecutors, judges, and parole and probation officers — are imperative
to reduce racial disparities. Such changes can be implemented without waiting for legislatures to act.
Participants also agreed that a systemic over-reliance on jails contributes to the underlying causes that
create racial disparities. Accordingly, the recommendations set forth in this report, drawn from the
Roundtable discussion, focus both on reducing jail usage and on changing local practices. They include:
•

Limiting the use of pretrial detention to individuals who pose a threat to public safety;

•

Increasing diversion programs for low-level offenses at the arrest, pre-charge, and pretrial
phases to reduce the number of people entering jails;

•

Setting specific goals to reduce racial disparities, including incentives to steer decisions and
success measures to track progress;

•

Creating cross-departmental task forces to identify drivers of racial disparities and devise
strategies to address them;

•

Requiring training to reduce implicit racial bias for all justice system actors — including police,
judges, prosecutors, probation officers, parole board members, correctional officers, and court
administrators;

•

Encouraging prosecutors to prioritize serious and violent offenses;

•

Increasing public defense representation for misdemeanor offenses;

•

Developing checklists (referred to as “bench cards”) for judges to use in hearings to combat
implicit biases in decision making and encourage alternatives to incarceration.

Each of these concrete recommendations can help decrease disparities. Implemented together, they
can work to reduce disparities and unnecessary incarceration across the justice system.
8 | Brennan Center for Justice

I.

RACIAL DISPARITIES: A LOCAL LOOK
Millions of people come into contact with local justice systems and spend time in America’s jails. On
any given day, approximately 740,000 Americans are in jails. Over the course of a year, 11.4 million are
admitted to the country’s 3,283 jails.6
Local jail systems, like prisons, have expanded since the 1980s and 1990s. The number of people
entering local jails has nearly doubled. And those who enter jails are more likely to stay there for longer.
In 1983, the average jail stay was 14 days. By 2013, it was 23 days.7
Today, counties spend millions to house this expanded jail population. New York City, with over
12,200 daily jail inmates, spends $460 per day per person — costing taxpayers more than $5.6 million
per day. Los Angeles County spends $129 per day per inmate to house an average of 17,400 inmates
— at a daily cost of $2.2 million.8
This section provides a summary of who is held in our jails. It then discusses the drivers of racial
disparities in jails as identified by Roundtable participants and the opportunity for reform.
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What are “racial and ethnic disparities”?
Racial and ethnic disparities refer to instances where a person experiences differential treatment or
outcomes based on his or her race or ethnic background.
Examples abound:
•

Almost one in three people arrested for drug law violations are African American, even
though drug use rates do not differ significantly by race or ethnicity.1 Though drug laws
are racially neutral, they are enforced in a way that disproportionately affects minorities.

•

Nationally, police stop African American drivers for traffic reasons slightly more often than
whites and Hispanics. A closer look at state and local data demonstrate that police are
significantly more likely to search, question, and arrest African Americans and Hispanics once
stopped.2 A recent report from the Sentencing Project concluded, “[o]nce pulled over, African
American and Hispanic drivers were three times as likely as whites to be searched and blacks
were twice as likely as whites to be arrested during a traffic stop.”3

•

Another study of misdemeanor arrest rates in New York City indicated that African
Americans were more than five times more likely to be arrested as whites, and Hispanics
were four times more likely to be arrested.4

Roundtable participants discussed these disturbing trends extensively. As one local government
participant explained, “When you look at a particular decision point, you see similarly situated people
treated differently. It may be unfair. It may be biased. There may be various reasons for these disparities.
The challenge for a jurisdiction is to go beneath the percentages and proportions to dig down to the
decision points where actual disparate treatment is taking place. We need to change decision making at
those points.”
Throughout this report, we refer to “racial disparities” as shorthand to encompass both racial and
ethnic disparities.5 While research indicates that troubling disparities exist for other minority
groups, particularly Native Americans, this report does not focus on these populations due to the
limited data available.

10 | Brennan Center for Justice

A.

Who is in Local Jails and Why?

The United States incarcerates 2.3 million people. This includes people held in two different types of
facilities: prisons and jails.
Prisons hold people convicted of state or federal crimes, serving long term sentences. They are operated
in a unified manner by a state or the federal government. Jails, on the other hand, are run by cities,
counties, or other local entities. They house higher volumes of people for shorter terms. People in jail
are either: detained while awaiting trial, convicted and awaiting transfer to prison, convicted of lowlevel crimes with short sentences, or incarcerated for violations of parole or probation. Some jails house
immigration detainees.9 Jails are not centrally managed. They operate independently and vary in practice
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. On any given day there are approximately 740,000 people in jails.

Entry Points to Jail
People reach jail in a variety of ways:
•

Jail Booking: Once an officer arrests someone, the officer must make a record of that arrest
(i.e. “book” the person). An officer takes the suspect to a local jail and places the individual
behind bars until the officer makes a full record of the arrest, including taking fingerprints,
collecting personal information, and documenting details of the alleged crime. Whether
someone arrested is admitted to jail — or simply cited and released — is a policy decision
made by each jurisdiction. A report from the Vera Institute of Justice suggests that police
are more likely to jail a suspect after arrest today than in the 1980s or 1990s.10

•

Pretrial Detention: If a prosecutor chooses to file charges based on an arrest, a person must
wait for trial. While waiting, a defendant can be released, given the opportunity to pay bail
(or be held if they cannot pay), or detained without bail. “Pretrial detention” is the practice
of incarcerating a defendant pending trial. Currently, 63 percent of those in jails are pretrial
detainees, accused of either misdemeanor or felony crimes.11

•

Misdemeanor Convictions: Misdemeanors are low-level criminal offenses that typically
carry a maximum sentence of less than a year in jail. These include nonviolent, traffic,
property, drug, or public order offenses. About 80 percent of state court dockets involve
misdemeanor prosecutions.12 Nearly 75 percent of people in jails are there for misdemeanor
crimes — either awaiting trial or convicted.13

•

Probation and Parole Violations: When someone violates the conditions of their parole or
probation, they are often held in jail for at least a short period of time. Probation typically
refers to a court-imposed sentence which a person serves under supervision in the community,
instead of behind bars. Parole typically refers to early release before the completion of a
sentence, and is usually granted for good behavior in prison. Both parole and probation
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involve strict conditions of supervision. If a person violates these conditions — which may
range from failing a drug test to committing a new crime — he is usually sent to jail until a
hearing occurs. Sometimes, he may serve the remainder of the sentence in jail, or he may be
sent back to prison.14 The rates at which people on probation and parole are re-incarcerated
vary by jurisdiction. For example, New York City’s probation revocation rate is 20 percent,
while revocation rates in Madison and Seneca counties approach 60 percent.15
•

Transfers: Jails sometimes hold people temporarily while they await transfer to another
facility. These facilities include: juveniles detention centers, mental health facilities, hospitals,
or prison. Jails may also hold federal or state inmates when prisons are overcrowded.16

Figure 1: General Population and Jail Demographics
Jail Population Demographics

General Population Demographics

2.2%

7.1%

White

14.8%

Black
17.1%

Hispanic

47.2%

35.8%

Other
62.6%
13.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.19
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African Americans and Hispanics are significantly overrepresented in jails. While together these groups
represent 30 percent of the general population, they account for 51 percent of the jail population. In
particular, African Americans are jailed at almost four times the rate of whites.17 Notably, national data
suggests that Hispanics are not disproportionately represented in jails. However, much research indicates
that Hispanics likely are, in fact, overrepresented in jails, but due to inaccurate and inconsistent data
collection, this trend is not captured in national data.18
Why do these disparities exist and how are they created?
From police stops to arrests to prosecution to probation and parole revocation, people of color frequently
experience harsher outcomes that lead to detention. At each of these decision points, various local
criminal justice actors exercise discretion that can lead to a person of color going to jail when a similarly
situated white person may not. Those collective decisions produce the racial and ethnic disparities
reflected in our jails. They can include:
•

Stops and Arrests: When police are confronted with possible criminal activity, they must decide what
action to take. They can decide to do nothing, issue a summons or verbal warning, direct the person
to social services or treatment, make an arrest, or take some other action.

•

Charging: Once a person has been arrested, prosecutors must decide whether to bring formal
criminal charges. If prosecutors accept a case, they exercise great discretion in what charges to file.

•

Pretrial Detention: Once arrested, a person can be detained pretrial. Judges, bail commissioners,
prosecutors, and sometimes police exercise discretion in whether to hold someone in jail or
release them until the case ends.

•

Short-term Sentences: Once a person is convicted of a crime — whether through a guilty plea or,
less commonly, a trial — a judge exercises discretion to decide the type and length of punishment
within the broad ranges set by local ordinance or statute. Prosecutors also have wide discretion in
recommending sentences. Most criminal sentences of less than a year are served in jails.

•

Probation and Parole Revocations: Judges, parole boards, probation departments, and
correctional officers have discretion in establishing conditions when people are placed on
probation or parole. They also exercise discretion in enforcing those conditions. A judge can
decide to revoke supervision for violations. Many offenders serve time in jails, not prison,
when their parole or probation is revoked.

This report recommends ways to reduce racial and ethnic disparities by changing decision making. As
shorthand, this report refers to racial disparities “in jails” to refer to all these decision points.
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A few additional trends relating to jails:
•

Lack of Treatment: Jails now serve as de facto mental health treatment centers. The most recent
research shows that almost two-thirds (64 percent) of jail inmates had mental health problem
and almost the same percent (68 percent) suffered from substance abuse problems.20 Today, sixty
percent of inmates admitted to Chicago’s Cook County jail are diagnosed with a mental illness.
Forty percent of inmates in New York City’s Riker’s Island jail have a mental illness, nearly doubling
since 2006.21 Inmates with mental illnesses stay in jail longer, too. In Orange County, Fla., jail
inmates generally stay an average of 26 days, whereas mentally ill inmates stay 51 days. In New
York’s Rikers Island jail, the average stay for all inmates is 42 days; mentally ill inmates, however,
stay on average 215 days.22

•

Increased Likelihood of Recidivism and Prison: Exposure to jails can prolong an individual’s
entanglement in the justice system more broadly. Research has found that pretrial detention in local
jails for even two-three days increases the likelihood that a defendant will commit a new crime upon
release.23 Jail stays also increase the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to incarceration after
conviction, and that they will receive a harsher sentence. This may occur due to the destabilizing
experience of being jailed, including loss of employment, loss of income, exposure to disease, and
increased opportunity for association with people prone to criminal behavior.24 As one Roundtable
participant, a local prosecutor, observed, “The criminal justice system is the only public service that
makes people worse off.”

•

Increased Fiscal Costs: Today, local governments spend $22.2 billion on jails — four times more than
in 1983. The Vera Institute’s 2015 study found that this cost is driven by larger jail populations,
which require larger correctional staff and other costs to run facilities.25

Figure 2: Risk of Recidivism & Pretrial Detention
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Figure 3: Mental Health and Length of Stay
Comparing jail inmates with and without mental health problems
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New York, New York

B. Contributors to Racial Disparities in Jails
The Roundtable participants discussed five major factors they believed contribute to the racial and
ethnic disparities reflected in the jail population.
1.

Focus on Low-Level Offenses

Police patrol the streets, engage with community residents, and investigate and respond to criminal
activity. Often, their response culminates in an arrest. In 2013 alone, police arrested more than 11
million people.28 Seventy percent of these arrests are for low-level offenses, such as drug abuse violations,
driving under the influence, disorderly contact, and drunkenness.29
While data shows that African Americans and Hispanics do commit certain crimes at higher rates
than whites, this does not account for the outsize representation of racial minorities in arrests overall.
Roundtable participants offered a sampling of reasons for this disparity in arrests, including:
•

Increased Likelihood of Being Stopped: A 2013 federal district court found that 83 percent of
those stopped by the New York City Police Department were African American or Hispanic,
even though these two groups were just 52 percent of the city’s population.30 Data presented in
a federal district court in a Philadelphia case revealed that, of the more than 253,000 pedestrians
stopped in 2009, more than 70 percent were African American or Hispanic.31 At the Roundtable,
a civil rights advocate provided this perspective: “Race plays out in excessive stops. In urban
America, Hispanics get stopped, detained, and questioned at rates that far surpass whites —
not nearly as far as blacks, but definitely far surpass whites. In parts of the country where the
suspicion of illegal presence is a predicate for the stop, it exacerbates this disparity.”

•

Increased Likelihood of Arrest: Evidence demonstrates that once stopped by a police officer,
African Americans are arrested at a higher rate than other racial groups. A recent study of 3,528
police departments found that blacks are more likely to be arrested in almost every city for
almost every type of crime. At least 70 police departments arrested black people at a rate ten
times higher than non-black people. In a suburb of Dearborn, Mich., the disparity in arrest
rates for blacks was a staggering 26 times the rate for other races.32

•

Increased Likelihood of Drug Arrests: African Americans are almost four times more likely to
be arrested for selling drugs and more than twice as likely to be arrested for possessing drugs,
even though whites are more likely to sell drugs and equally likely to consume them.33 African
Americans constitute 30 percent of arrests for drug violation offenses even though they make
up only 13 percent of the total population.34 One participant put it this way: “A white and
black defendant — whether a drug offender, drug user, or drug peddler — receives obviously
different treatment in the criminal justice system.”

•

Increased Likelihood of Traffic Citations: A 2012 study of Washington state police practices
demonstrates that while minorities and whites are stopped at the same rate for driving violations,
African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to receive citations. For each stop, whites
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received on average 1.74 citations, while African Americans received 1.94 and Hispanics received
1.98.35 A 2012 report for the state of Minnesota indicated that African Americans were 20 times
more likely to be stopped for a traffic offense than whites.36 These violations include such things as
driving without insurance or driving on a suspended license.37 Said one participant, “To address
racial disparities, we need to think about how we use the traffic code to pull over motorists. So
many consequences flow from the ability of the police to stop a car for a traffic infraction. Many
people’s first contact with the justice system is based on a broken taillight or an expired license
plate. Cities and counties may want to consider curbing minor traffic infraction stops.”
Roundtable participants discussed how police practices influence other decisions in the local justice
system to increase racial disparities. A law enforcement leader observed, “Police are the first contact
point — they usually make the first decisions about who gets pulled into the criminal justice system.”
A member of the judiciary noted, “The numbers of misdemeanor and drug cases in our courts are
driven by police practices. Often disparate policing practices end up producing more low-level cases in
our courts particularly against minority defendants.” Several participants confirmed this point, noting
that disparate enforcement results in disparate outcomes. An advocate explained as follows: “Reducing
the jail population requires understanding the reality that communities face selective enforcement on
a daily basis. You can change how the system reacts, but that’s not going to stop the faucet. The faucet
here is the large number of people of color entering the system through arrests.”
Today, arrests are more likely to lead to punishment and jail time for defendants than in previous decades.
A 2014 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research identified more punitive treatment after arrest
as a driver of incarceration nationally.38 As the Vera Institute recently noted, “[t]he likelihood that arrest will
lead to a jail booking has increased steadily” in the last 30 years.39 Racial disparities in arrests exacerbate racial
disparities in incarceration.40 A participant in law enforcement explained this sentiment, noting, “Once an
arrest is made, it’s like turning on an engine that only knows how to do one thing: incarcerate.”
Research also demonstrates that minorities tend to be punished more severely than white counterparts
for the low-level, misdemeanor drug and property offenses that lead to jail sentences.41 For example:
•

A 2014 Vera Institute study of New York County found that 30 percent of African American
defendants were sentenced to jail for misdemeanor offenses, compared to 20 percent of Hispanic
defendants and 16 percent of white defendants. African Americans were 89 percent more likely
to be jailed for misdemeanor “person offenses” (such as assault) and 85 percent more likely to be
incarcerated for misdemeanor drug offenses compared to white defendants. Hispanic defendants
were 32 percent more likely to be incarcerated for misdemeanor person offenses.42

•

A 2003 study of misdemeanor sentences in five Nebraska counties found that non-white defendants
were sentenced to fines more than 40 percent higher than those imposed on white defendants for
similar offenses. However, the study found that white defendants received 20 percent higher fines
than non-white counterparts when charged with more serious misdemeanor offenses.43
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Roundtable participants spoke frequently about the increased probability that low-level arrests result in
jail time for minorities. As one participant explained, “Misdemeanor convictions, not felony cases, really
create the volume of jail inmates. They add up. Incarceration in our jails is mostly for low-level offenses
— which can actually be dealt with in better ways.” Another explained, “We need to look at the entire
process of what happens in misdemeanor courts. Most defendants don’t have lawyers, and most cases
result in guilty pleas. To reduce disparities, we need to first look at the outcomes in misdemeanor cases.”
An advocate added: “We need to look at alternative sentences for misdemeanors other than jail time.
We really need to look at the top five drivers of county jails populations. These are crimes like public
intoxication, driving with a suspended license, or not paying child support. We need to look at why we are
incarcerating such a high volume of people for these crimes, and how we can safely change that.”
2.	Unnecessary Use of Pretrial Detention
Once a person has been arrested, he or she may be held in jail while criminal charges are resolved. Most often,
a judge, magistrate, or bail commissioner will decide whether or not to release a defendant before charges
are resolved. There are three options at these hearings: release on bail, release without bail (commonly called
“released on own recognizance”), or hold pretrial in jail. The decision is determined by a number of factors,
including whether the person is a threat to public safety and the likelihood of appearing in court.
In most jurisdictions, setting a monetary bail amount is used as a proxy for this analysis. Money bail is
intended to ensure that the person will show up to court appearances and will not engage in criminal
activity. Nationally, 61 percent of defendants were required to post financial bail for their release.44
Between 1992 and 2006, the use of money bail increased by 32 percent,45 and the average bail amount
increased by more than $30,000.46
Unnecessarily detaining defendants in jail before trial has a significant negative impact on the defendant,
and often on public safety, including:
•

Harsher Punishment: Research found that defendants detained for the entire period before trial
were more than four times more likely to be sentenced to jail and more than three times more
likely to be sentenced to prison compared to released defendants. Defendants jailed before
trial also received jail sentences three times longer and prison sentences twice as long as those
released.47 Those detained before trial are also more likely to plead guilty.48

•

Increased Likelihood of Recidivism: Even short periods of pretrial detention for low-risk defendants
can compromise public safety. Low-risk defendants are defined as “individuals who can be released
with little or no supervisory conditions with reasonable assurances that they will appear in court
and will not threaten community safety.”49 A 2013 study — which examined 153,000 defendants
jailed in Kentucky between 2009 and 2010 — found that low-risk defendants held for two-three
days were almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial compared to defendants
released within 24 hours. When held for 8-14 days, defendants were 51 percent more likely to
commit another crime compared to defendants released within 24 hours.50

•

Socio-economic Consequences: Studies have shown that jail detention between arrest and dismissal
or conviction can lead to the loss of employment, housing, or even medical coverage.51
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Research confirms that racial disparities exist in the use of pretrial detention. For example:
•

A 2012 study found that African American and Hispanic defendants were more likely to be detained
pending trial, less likely to be able to afford their bail (which was assessed at higher amounts), and
less likely to be granted release in comparison to similarly situated white defendants.52

•

A 2013 study by the Vera Institute found race and ethnicity a predictive factor in determining
whether defendants were detained or released at arraignment. These disparities were most
extreme for misdemeanor offenses, where African Americans were 20 percent more likely than
whites to be detained before trial.53

•

A study for the Bureau of Justice Statistics concluded that African American defendants were 66
percent more likely to be detained before trial and Hispanic defendants 91 percent more likely to
be detained, in comparison to white defendants. Hispanics were also 39 percent more likely to be
charged a bail amount in exchange for pretrial release — and were required to pay higher amounts.54

Roundtable participants recognized that reducing reliance on pretrial detention can reduce racial disparities
in local jails. Said one participant, “The impact of reducing pretrial detention is twofold: It reduces the
number of people detained and it dramatically reduces the number of people of color detained since they
typically constitute a very large portion of the detention population.” To the extent that pretrial detention
hinges on an individual’s ability to pay bail — as opposed to assessing his or her threat to public safety
— the brunt will be felt by poor people of color. A leading scholar on race and pretrial justice explained,
“Thousands and thousands of people are in jail for relatively minor offenses solely because they cannot pay
a fairly nominal bail amount.” Another participant in pretrial justice echoed the concern: “Communities
of color are usually also the most economically depressed. So money — or lack thereof — plays a major
role in creating racial disparities in our money-based pretrial system.”
3.

Expansion in Parole and Probation

Over the past 30 years, the number of people held on parole or probation (referred to as “community
supervision”) more than doubled.55 The United States places individuals on probation and parole at a
far higher rate than other democratic countries.56 Today, about 1 in 51 adults — or 4.8 million people
— are on probation or parole, far exceeding the number of people incarcerated in the country.57
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Figure 4: Correctional Populations in the United States (1985-2013)
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There are often many conditions placed upon individuals under supervision — some genuinely related
to public safety and others not. Some are difficult to comply with, particularly for defendants living in
poor urban centers or those battling substance abuse. Conditions may include: work or school attendance;
medical or psychiatric treatment; payment of child support, court costs, or other fees; periodic reporting
to an officer; remaining in the court’s jurisdiction; or house arrest or electronic monitoring.59 While some
conditions are necessary, other conditions can become overly burdensome to certain individuals, and may
undermine successful reintegration into society. For example, requiring someone to pay fees when they do
not have a job creates a situation where the person cannot meet their supervision conditions and is likely
to violate them. Parole and probation officers and judges have discretion in how to respond to violations of
conditions. Violation of conditions often results in revocation to jail or prison.60
Data also reflect racial disparities in responses to probation and parole violations:
•

A 2009 study conducted by the National Council on Crime & Delinquency found that African
Americans are seven times more likely to be sent back to prison for parole violations and
four times more likely to be sent to prison for probation violations in comparison to whites.
Hispanics were almost three times as likely to be sent back to prison for parole violations.61

•

In 2014, an Urban Institute study of four counties found African Americans had their probation
revoked at higher rates than both white and Hispanic probationers. In Dallas County, Texas,
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African American probationers were revoked to prison at a rate 55 percent higher than white
probationers. In Multnomah County, Ore., the level of revocation was more than twice as high.62
Roundtable participants repeatedly asserted that increases in the number of people on parole and
probation contributes to the growth of local justice systems. A participant who was formerly incarcerated
stated: “We’re trying to shrink the beast, right? In order to shrink jails, we should shrink the number
of people on parole and probation, too. Those people easily find themselves in jail simply for failure
to comply with the really restrictive conditions imposed on them.” A prosecutor agreed: “Particularly
for misdemeanors, research shows that over-supervising people — getting overly involved in their lives
— actually increases the likelihood of recidivism. Misdemeanants tend to have jobs. They are often
law abiding people who made a mistake that caught the attention of the police. Once you kick the
juggernaut of the criminal justice system into action for a misdemeanor, you are likely to get worse
outcomes. We need to be more careful about who we place on parole and probation, and when we send
them to jail for violations.”
4.

Perverse Incentives that Increase Incarceration

In part, the criminal justice system has expanded due to perverse financial incentives to increase arrests,
seizures, pretrial detentions, convictions, prison sentences, and revocations back to jail or prison. As one
participant put it, “Expansion of the criminal justice system is partially a matter of economics. If you follow
the financial incentives of the system, you can see exactly why and how it’s expanded so dramatically.”
In response to a crime epidemic in the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers implemented changes that led
to an explosion in the number of people entering the criminal justice system.63 With this growth came
a flood in government spending. As explained in several recent Brennan Center reports, too often, the
measurement for success in reducing crime became volume-dependent, focusing on the number of
arrests, convictions, or prisoners.64 States devised severe sentencing regimes, enticed in part by federal
funding for prisons and other financial supplements. Government funding created incentives to pull
more people into the pipeline toward incarceration, sometimes directly and sometimes inadvertently.
These financial incentives help shape criminal justice policy and increase the size of the system. Here are
some examples of how they can play out at the local level:
•

Volume-Based Performance Measures: The Justice Department’s March 2015 report on practices
in Ferguson, Mo., highlights the impact of performance measures. The Ferguson Police
Department measured its performance based on revenue collected through enforcement
tactics. As the Justice Department reported, “Where [Ferguson Police Department] officers
fail to meet productivity goals [of making arrests and issuing citations], supervisors have
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been instructed to alter officer assignments or impose discipline.” Similarly, performance
evaluations heavily emphasized “productivity,” with one specific evaluation measure as “[i]
ncrease/consistent in productivity, the ability to maintain an average ticket [amount] of 28
per month.” As the report concludes, “the City goes so far as to direct [the Ferguson Police
Department] to develop enforcement strategies and initiatives, not to better protect the public,
but to raise more revenue.”65 These and other types of volume-based performance measures are
common throughout the criminal justice system. They incentivize a larger system — including
more arrests and more people in jail — without necessarily promoting public safety.
•

Cost-shifting between Agencies: Probation officers are often granted the authority to initiate
proceedings to revoke a defendant to prison or jail for failure to comply with supervision
conditions.66 Notably, counties and cities pay for the cost of probation, but the state pays
for the cost of incarceration in prison. When probation officers, who generally work for the
county, revoke probationers to prison, they do not need to consider the fiscal costs of that
decision.67 Most of these revocations result in jail time.68

•

Pressure to Generate Revenue: Law enforcement agencies often generate revenue for their budgets
by seizing the property of individuals suspected of criminal activity. In a survey of nearly 800
law enforcement agencies, nearly 40 percent reported that seizing the property of criminal
suspects (a practice called civil asset forfeiture) was a “necessary” budget supplement.69 A 2010
report found that asset forfeiture accounted for more than 14 percent of police budgets in
Texas, with rural jurisdictions averaging 18 percent.70 Making police budgets dependent in
any way on seizing the property of suspects creates clear incentives to increase seizures — even
if there is little public safety value in doing so. Along with increased seizures, usually comes
an increase in arrests, charges, and pretrial detention. A 2007 study found that a one percent
increase in forfeiture proceeds correlates with a .66 percent increase in the drug arrest rate.71
Conservatives, progressives, and some law enforcement officials have noted the problematic
nature of this type of revenue generation.72

Many participants — from prosecutors to defense attorneys — referenced the performance measures
used to assess “success” of local agencies, and their potential to create perverse incentives. As a member
of the defense bar explained, “An important question in this conversation is: What are the metrics of
success in our justice system? If we fund agencies based on the number of cases they prosecute, the
number of people they arrest or the number of clients they defend — and then punish them when
those numbers go down by taking away resources — we perpetuate our problems. Then the system
grows without a purpose.” Another participant, a prosecutor, put it this way: “We need to start thinking
about what those metrics should be for each stage of the process. What should the metric be for good
policing? What should the metric be for good prosecution? For good probation? We should create the
financial incentives — the performance measures, the revenue generation, the costs — based on those
goals.” One participant summed it up: “Money is a ‘stakeholder’ in the justice system. It contributes to
the expansion of the system, including our jail population.”
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5.

Aggressive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt

Criminal defendants are frequently required to pay various expenses at different stages of their processing
through the system. Unlike punitive fines or restitution to compensate the victims of crimes, these “user fees”
are imposed solely to raise revenue. Cash-strapped states and local jurisdictions are increasingly imposing fees
at every point in the system — from fees for public defender services to parole supervision charges.
Fees are often imposed without considering a defendant’s ability to pay.73 If a defendant cannot pay
the fees immediately, they multiply. Many states charge extra fees for entering into payment plans
and impose unreasonable interest rates for such plans.74 Coupled with aggressive collection practices
— ranging from driver’s license suspensions to wage garnishments to arrest and re-incarceration —
criminal justice debt can prolong entanglement with the criminal justice system even after a defendant
has served his or her sentence.75 This prevents their reintegration into law-abiding society.
Though the Supreme Court prohibited incarceration as a penalty for those too poor to pay court fees and
fines, states still use aggressive debt collection practices that result in incarceration for nonpayment.76
A 2010 Brennan Center study found that in the 15 states with the largest prison populations, reincarcerating individuals for failing to pay debts is common. In all 15 states, payment of criminal justice
debt was a condition of probation or parole. At least 11 states authorized incarceration for failing to pay
criminal justice debt. Two states offered defendants the opportunity to “choose” jail as an alternative
to paying debts. Additionally, counties in all 15 states arrested people for failing to pay criminal justice
debt or appearing at debt-related hearings. These arrests led to jail stays.77 More recently, the Justice
Department report on Ferguson, Mo.’s criminal justice system identified the same problem, finding:
“The municipal court routinely issued warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to
timely pay related fees and fines.”78
Increased fees lead to an increased likelihood of returning to jail if unable to pay. Data, though limited,
suggest that these fees are disproportionately imposed on racial and ethnic minorities:
•

A 2004 Washington state study found that Hispanics generally received 4.8 percent higher fees
for felony convictions compared to whites convicted of similar offenses.79

•

A Philadelphia study conducted between 1994 and 2000 found that user fees were significantly
more likely to be imposed on African Americans, though whites received more punitive fines
(such as restitution).80

•

An Illinois study found that, while white probationers received a higher number of separate
fees, the size of the fees levied on minorities were larger by comparison.81

Criminal justice debt was discussed briefly at the Roundtable. As one participant stated, “Once people
enter the justice system, money — or the lack of it — directly affects whether they enter jail. In reality, 98
percent of people who come through our system cannot afford $50. Even though some fees seem nominal
in theory, they are costly in application for people making minimum wage or below, and those living in
poverty.” A conservative advocate agreed on the topic of fines, saying, “People should not be incarcerated
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simply for being poor.” He pointed to this pattern in relation to outstanding warrants, specifically: “We
ought to figure out a better way to address outstanding warrants than just sending people to jail. In
Ferguson, each house had at least three warrants on average that led to jail stays. That seems excessive.”
Participants discussed at length the role of socioeconomic inequality in perpetuating racial disparities.
As one participant explained, “I think much of the overreliance on incarceration today is related to
increasing socioeconomic inequality in American society. For those left out of the growing middle
class in the 1970s and 1980s, changes in the economy and society made their situations worse. That
contributed to communities experiencing social disorder of various kinds — including increased
crime and incarceration.” An academic noted, “Racial disparities are undergirded by socioeconomic
inequality. These two factors mutually reinforce each other. In Washington state, data demonstrates no
racial disparity when it comes to who police stop. But there is significant disparity in how many tickets
police issue once they stop people. This affects who ends up in jail for not paying tickets. These are
important intersections of race and class that need to be addressed.”

C.

The Role of Implicit Bias

Racial disparities are not always the product of intentional biases. They are frequently the result of
unconscious and unintentional biases that everyone — African American, white, Hispanic or other —
learns and maintains culturally.
“Implicit bias” refers to the mental attitudes or stereotypes toward a person or group that unconsciously
affect a person’s thoughts, actions, and decisions.82 This concept is grounded in sociological and
psychological research demonstrating that human “thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped by factors
largely outside of our conscious awareness, control or intention.”83 This dynamic is particularly strong
with regard to racial perceptions in the criminal justice system. Stanford Prof. Jennifer Eberhardt’s
groundbreaking research demonstrates that white men shown a fleeting image of a black male face were
able to recognize the outline of a gun in subsequent photos more quickly than those people shown
images of a white male face. The study implies an association with race and crime that Eberhardt argues
can unintentionally infect decision makers in the criminal justice system.84 A recent criminology study
suggested that implicit bias could lead a police officer to “automatically perceive crime in the making”
when seeing two young Hispanic males driving in an all-Caucasian neighborhood.85Another study
assessing cognitive bias, found that 87 percent of judges more quickly associated white with “good” and
black with “bad,” suggesting a preference toward white defendants that could play out in the courtroom.86
Roundtable participants repeatedly emphasized how implicit bias contributes to racial disparities. They
all agreed that implicit bias needs to be addressed head-on to help reduce disparities in treatment. A
law enforcement representative explained, “We need to have conversations about implicit bias and how
to break through these biases. We need to self-reflect and understand that — as a police officer, chief,
policymaker, or judge — we carry these biases with us and they affect our decisions. The challenge is
that actors often feel attacked when we talk about racial disparities. They think we are accusing them of
being racist. But more often than not, these biases are unconscious. If we can engage law enforcement
in particular to understand these biases, they can become a solution to the problem.” An advocate
agreed, “It’s no secret that our system treats people of color and whites differently. Communities of
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color, especially Latino communities, want answers for why this is happening because they are losing
faith in the legitimacy of the justice system. We need to collectively understand why these disparities
are occurring and how to prevent them.”
As another participant explained, “Sometimes when we are silent about race in our communications,
subconscious fears and stereotypes win the day. If we don’t address implicit bias directly in conversations
about reform, it will impede progress toward improving any aspect of the justice system, not just
the racial equity component.” A local judge added, “When my jurisdiction decided to confront the
influence of race or ethnicity in outcomes, we said it. It’s critical that we try to prevent the influence of
unconscious bias in our justice system.”
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II.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECREASE INCARCERATION AND RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN JAILS
This section proposes reforms to change local practices and policies that lead to the racial and ethnic
disparities reflected in jails. These recommendations provide a sampling of the most powerful ideas
expressed by Roundtable experts.
Participants emphasized that, to fully reduce racial disparities, jurisdictions must also focus on reducing
their overreliance on jail detention. As one participant explained, “The easiest way to reduce disparities
is just to arrest more white people, but obviously that does not further justice. It’s a fair assumption
that if we reduce the size of the system and figure out ways to keep people out of it, we will improve
the disparity problem.” Many agreed. One advocate, however, noted that cutting jail populations alone
may not reduce racial disparities: “We would reduce the jail population by diverting some people out
but the disparities in the system may remain if we don’t have a clear focus on reducing racial disparities.”
A scholar agreed, stating, “I understand that a rising tide lifts all boats and that African Americans and
Hispanics may disproportionately benefit from a reduction in jail use, but it is hard to ensure racially
just outcomes through color blind mechanisms.” A director of a local correctional facility provided a
real world example, explaining, “In the jurisdiction that I am from, the level of imprisonment is down
by 26 percent, and very clearly the number of minorities incarcerated is down too. But the percentage
of the population has not changed.”
Overall, participants agreed that both goals — a reduction in jail populations and a reduction in
racial disparities — must be sought. While reforms to state and federal law are valuable and needed
to meet these goals, participants focused on local policies and practices that could change without
legislative interventions. These recommendations seek to provide solutions at each step of the justice
system leading to jail — including arrests, pretrial detentions, prosecutions, court decisions, parole and
probation revocations, and other key decisions — that will reduce racial disparities and jail populations.

1.

Reduce Reliance on Pretrial Detention

Roundtable participants universally agreed that reducing pretrial detention is essential to reducing
racial disparities. A recent report from the Vera Institute found that the average length of stay in jails
increased from 14 days in 1983 to 23 days in 2013. The report concluded that “it is highly likely that
the increase in the average length of stay is largely driven by longer stays in jails by people who are
unconvicted of any crime.”87 In other words, the practice of detaining defendants waiting for trial is a
major contributor to jail populations.
A criminal justice policy expert at the Roundtable noted, “The amount of people we detain before trial
drives up the jail population. Many of these people don’t need to be held in jail while waiting for trial.
Many are unlikely to commit new crimes and could be safely released.” Participants emphasized that jail
should prioritize housing dangerous defendants. They identified two specific interventions.
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Introduce Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools
Participants recommended jurisdictions adopt validated risk assessment instruments (“RAIs”). RAIs
measure the risk that a person will reoffend if and when released and identify needed treatments and
intervention to reduce that risk. RAIs weigh a number of factors, usually including “static factors”
(which cannot change, such as criminal history, age, and race) and certain “dynamic factors” (which can
change, such as drug dependence, mental health, associating with antisocial peers, and employment).88
A RAI is considered validated and acceptable for use when it is shown, through rigorous research and
testing, to accurately predict risks and does not show biases toward defendants based on race, ethnicity,
gender, or financial status.89 When used pretrial, an RAI predicts the likelihood that a defendant may
fail to appear for court hearings or be arrested on a new charge prior to the completion of their case.90
Roundtable participants discussed RAIs’ effectiveness in reducing racial disparities. A law enforcement
representative explained, “All jurisdictions should start using risk assessment tools so that they make
pretrial decisions based on threat to public safety, not bias or guesses.” However, a criminal justice
reform advocate noted, “We are really concerned that risk assessments may disproportionately benefit
white defendants. Considering things like prior arrests can create disparities when people of color tend
to live in neighborhoods with more police patrolling them, which leads to more contact with police and
more arrests for low-level offenses. But the alternative to a risk assessment is a judge’s gut feeling. That
may be worse.” An advocate provided additional detail: “Risk assessment tools would guide judges’
discretion. Data from some California jurisdictions does show that these tools reduce racial disparity
even though race is baked into factors like a prior record and employment. The key is to reduce or
eliminate elements of the tools that produce disparities, and then put them to use.”
Many participants stressed the value of risk assessment tools: They center pretrial decisions on threats
to public safety and flight risk, whereas the current system, with its focus on a defendant’s ability to pay
money bail, does not. One participant noted, “In the current bail system, we have a lot of discretion
with no accountability. The bail official, who may or may not even be a lawyer, decides to release the
defendant or sets a bail amount. Sometimes decisions are made on a predetermined schedule, but
usually they are set by practice. No one is looking to see if there is a real basis for the bail amount. No
one is looking to see whether the decision is tied to flight risk or community safety. We need a system
that requires actors to justify their discretionary decisions.” Another participant concurred, “The use of
risk assessments prevents decision makers from falling back on implicit biases that may cause them to
assume that individuals of color are more dangerous and more in need of detention. Overall, they are a
good tool to reduce racial disparities and jail detentions while preserving public safety.”
Some jurisdictions have successfully used RAIs to reduce incarceration and racial disparities:
•

Mecklenburg County, N.C., developed a pretrial risk assessment tool in 2010. Their pretrial
services agency uses it to make bail recommendations and determine appropriate levels of
supervision for defendants waiting for trial. Within two years, the county reduced its daily jail
population by 33 percent and decreased its average monetary bond amount by 30 percent.91 A
scholar at the Roundtable explained the significance of such reform: “Considering flight risk
and danger to the community instead of ability to pay a monetary bail amount has a huge
impact on the racial composition of pretrial detainees, since socioeconomic status and race
tend to overlap in the justice system.”
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•

Portland, Ore., similarly piloted an RAI to use in juvenile detention. It specifically sought
to use race neutral factors, for example eliminating the use of “good family structure” as a
factor because it had a racially disparate impact and replacing it with “engaging in productive
activity” (which could include school, training, or part-time employment). Detention for
juveniles dropped by 36 percent in five years after making this simple change. Within 12 years,
the release rate for African Americans at initial screening rose from 44 to 51 percent and release
at preliminary hearings increased from 24 to 33 percent.92 These numbers were more in line
with the rates for white defendants before the RAI was implemented.

Bolster and Expand Pretrial Services Programs
Participants also recommended increasing resources for existing pretrial services programs. As one
advocate explained, “We’ve known for 50 years that pretrial services would reduce incarceration, but
some jurisdictions still don’t have pretrial services programs. We’ve got to get people to adopt the
techniques that work.”
Examples of successful pretrial services programs abound:
•

New York City’s Criminal Justice Agency provides defendants with pretrial services. It
conducts pre-arraignment interviews, makes recommendations for pretrial release based on
risk assessments, and notifies defendants about court appearances. The Agency monitors its
performance and revises its services as necessary. In 2013, arraignment judges followed the
Agency’s recommendation for pretrial release without bail in 92 percent of misdemeanor cases
and 61 percent of felony cases reviewed by the Agency.93

•

Washington, D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency provides defendants with services to reduce
recidivism, including employment services and drug treatment. The agency conducts robust
research to evaluate its results. It has met or exceeded most of its established targets, and is
lauded as a national model. In 2014, 89 percent of released defendants remained arrest free.94

•

In 2012, Colorado introduced an RAI into their pretrial services program for those arrested and
booked into jails. The tool helped standardize pretrial services recommendations.95 Defendants
assessed for risk and supervised pretrial were more than three times more likely to be released
before trial compared to those who were not assessed. Participation in the pretrial services
program — with use of the RAI — reduced the risk of incarceration by 34 percent. African
American defendants who received pretrial services were more than 1.5 times as likely to have
their cases dismissed compared to African American defendants not receiving those services.96
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2.

Divert Low-Level Offenders from Jail

Most participants agreed that changes to law enforcement strategies could reduce racial disparities.
Diversion programs — which divert individuals from the standard arrest-detention-incarceration cycle —
are one effective reform. They enable offenders to access needed social services when appropriate instead
of simply landing behind bars. They continue to protect public safety, as these social services often reduce
recidivism, while also reducing the jail population and increasing life outcomes for individuals.
A law enforcement representative at the Roundtable noted, “We all need to focus on diversion. Both
police and prosecutors need more programs and practices that encourage us to divert people when
possible.” Participants recommended increasing diversion programs at two specific points.
Expand Pre-Arrest Diversion Programs
Several jurisdictions have developed programs to encourage police officers to divert individuals toward
treatment in lieu of arrest.
•

Seattle’s Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) is a prime example. LEAD allows and
encourages police officers to direct people suspected of low-level crimes, particularly drug
crimes and prostitution, into community-based treatment or services instead of arresting and
jailing them. A 2015 University of Washington report found that participants were up to 60
percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime within the first six months of entering the
program, and 58 percent less likely to be arrested in the future overall.97

•

In High Point, N.C., law enforcement worked with the community to institute an intervention
program in 2004 to eliminate open air drug markets and reduce violence. Law enforcement
first identifies gang members at high risk of selling drugs or engaging in violence. They then
meet with these individuals, providing them the option of either: continuing their criminal
activity and facing immediate arrest, or ending the offending activity. If the individual chooses
the latter, no punitive action is taken. Instead, the agencies conduct an RAI and connect
the individual with needed treatment or services. A 2012 National Institute of Justice study
concluded that the High Point program reduced violence in target areas.98 It also allows
individuals to avoid arrest and further criminal justice processing.

Participants agreed that practices providing police with alternatives to arrest should be expanded. As a
local prosecutor said, “Why don’t all police departments have diversion programs? We need to empower
police to divert people at the earliest possible point to avoid clogging up the system with low-level cases.”
Increase Pre-Charge and Pretrial Diversion Programs
Participants also suggested increasing diversion programs in prosecutors’ offices. There are two types of
prosecutorial diversion programs. In pre-charge programs, prosecutors have discretion to divert individuals
to treatment or other services rather than prosecute. In pretrial programs, defendants are formally charged
with a crime, but prosecutors agree to drop those charges upon completion of a program.
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A few examples of successful programs:
•

Hennepin County, Minn. has a successful pre-charge and pretrial diversion program. People
with limited criminal histories are eligible for the pre-charge program. If they complete
the program, they avoid new criminal charges.99 The county also has two pretrial diversion
programs: one for defendants facing felony property or drug offenses, and one for defendants
facing misdemeanor offenses. In both, participants must attend meetings with case managers
and meet supervision conditions, such as community service or random drug testing. If they
complete the program, prosecutors dismiss the criminal charges.100

•

The prosecutor’s office in Thurston County, Wash., set up a pre-charge diversion program in
2009. Anyone facing a misdemeanor offense can choose to enroll in the diversion program
instead of being prosecuted for the offense. Approximately 70 percent of defendants complete
the program, avoiding a new criminal charge. In the first year, cases filed decreased by 22
percent. As one prosecutor in the county stated, “Pre-charge diversion lets our prosecutors
focus on the more serious crimes.”101 Notably, both the Hennepin and Thurston County
programs partnered with local nonprofits to provide participants with needed services.

Several participants expressed concern that the eligibility criteria for diversion programs can have racially
disparate effects. For example, many diversion programs are limited to individuals who committed
first-time and low-level offenses. But, as one participant explained, “Race is baked into whether or not
someone has a prior record. If you live in an urban community of color, there are more police patrolling
your streets than in a white upper-middle class suburb. So you are naturally more likely to be stopped
or arrested.”
Scholar Traci Schlesinger conducted a study, published in 2013, on pretrial diversion in felony cases in
urban counties from 1990 to 2006. Schlesinger found that, even controlling for criminal history and
offense severity, black defendants were 28 percent less likely and Hispanics about 13 percent less likely
to receive pretrial diversion compared to similarly situated white defendants.102 A study of a diversion
program in Travis County, Texas, also found disparities. African Americans, who make up 32 percent of
felony arrestees, accounted for only 9 percent of the 131 defendants accepted into the pretrial diversion
program. Applications were lower among African Americans — only 16 African- American defendants
applied in that time period. Defense counsel and former local judges attributed the low number of
applicants to a deterrent effect that played out more acutely for African Americans.103
In response to this concern, participants emphasized that diversionary programs need to ensure equal
treatment of different races. One member of law enforcement explained, “We need to make sure that
our diversion programs do not contribute to the racial disparities. For example, rules that make people
ineligible for these programs because of a previous record need to be reexamined when we know such
a condition has a racially biased effect.” Another researcher noted: “The key is collecting data on the
results of diversion programs.” It may also require expanding criteria to ensure they are not racially
biased in any way. Conditions and program details should also be modified to eliminate any racial
disparities observed in results. Some jurisdictions have taken steps in this direction by introducing RAIs
as parts of the diversion programs.104
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3.

Create Incentives and Success Measures to Reduce Racial Disparities

Reducing racial disparities while reducing jail populations requires clearly defined criteria and
measurable goals. However, participants recognized that the political will and resources to address
the drivers of racial disparities will vary among jurisdictions. Accordingly, they recommended that
jurisdictions identify specific drivers of racial disparities and then create measures of success.
Identify Drivers
As a first step, jurisdictions should conduct a wholesale examination to pinpoint where disparities
are the most pervasive. At the Roundtable, a leader of a criminal justice advocacy group stressed the
importance of “targeting the actual drivers of disparities.” Reflecting on personal experience, he noted,
“Sometimes we suspect that disparities derive from a particular practice and then focus on reforming
that practice. But sometimes our guesses are incorrect. Focusing reform efforts on the wrong practice
wastes effort and misses an opportunity to solve the real problem.”
For this reason, it is critical to assess, through data, how these disparities are created in each jurisdiction.
This is an ideal task for a cross-departmental task force (a recommendation discussed below). One
participant observed, “Each county needs to take an inventory to assess who is in their system. In my
experience, taking an inward look at your own system is the first step to changing practices. County
jails generally haven’t yet taken on these types of self-assessments.” Another participant with previous
experience working with jurisdictions to reduce racial disparities agreed, “We avoided some of the
political sensitivities involved in discussing racialized issues by going straight to collecting data in our
jurisdiction. Every jurisdiction needs to have data to help identify where there is a problem.” A law
enforcement official agreed: “Each jurisdiction needs to start with baseline data — whether it’s good,
bad, or indifferent — to inform the work that they are going to do going forward.”
Collecting data to identify the specific practices that drive racial disparities is a critical first step.
Create Specific Goals and Success Measures
Participants agreed that any implemented policy or practice should be accompanied by clear, measurable
goals that identify “success” toward reducing disparities. As it’s often said, “what gets measured,
gets done.”105 Many participants at the convening — from defense counsel to prosecutors to law
enforcement officials to advocates — focused on the need for rigorous success measures. Goals could
include decreasing racial disparities by a certain percentage within a certain time frame, or reforming
practices identified as problematic within a specified time period.
One participant from the judiciary warned that “people will get frustrated if progress is not achieved.”
Clear goals, with progress measured over time, are necessary to achieve change. They provide valuable
feedback to government actors and the public about whether and to what extent a reform is addressing a
problem. They also ensure common goals are achieved across different jurisdictions. As one participant
said, “It is hard to mandate something across dozens of counties in a state. It’s easier to create a metric
that you want all jurisdictions to meet, then let each jurisdiction come up with their unique ways to
achieve that goal.”
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When implementing measures to reduce racial disparities, jurisdictions should also work to eliminate
harmful measures that focus on an increase in volume. Volume-based measures such as the number of
tickets, citations, arrests, convictions, or probation or parole revocations — can incentivize government
actors to increase these numbers, thereby increasing the number of people processed through the
system. They can interfere with progress toward reducing jail populations and the racial disparities
found within them.
Create Incentives
One of the most important effects of success measures: they create incentives that drive individual
decision making toward common goals. If people know their performance is measured based on clear
goals, they will drive toward those goals. Former Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council
of Economic Advisors and Harvard Prof. N. Gregory Mankiw articulates this fundamental tenet in
Principles of Economics, one of the most widely used introductory economics textbooks. He says: “People
respond to incentives. The rest is commentary.” Mankiw goes on to note that “[w]hen policymakers
fail to consider how their policies affect incentives, they often end up with results they did not intend.”
In the case of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, unintended consequences helped create
them. Clarity about desired outcomes can help reduce them.
Roundtable participants echoed this approach throughout the two-day convening. A leading prosecutor
said: “We need measures to create incentives.” A participant from law enforcement urged, “Using
success measures that count volume are closely tied to the explosion in incarceration.” A criminal
justice advocate put it this way: “The challenge is that we need data to measure the impact of initiatives.
Without the data, we cannot measure success.” A member of the defense bar added, “We need to figure
out the qualitative change we want to see. And then figure out a way to measure that to ensure agencies
prioritize working toward this change.”

4.

Create Cross-Departmental Task Forces to Reduce Racial Disparities

Participants agreed that cross-departmental task forces can be a valuable way to create change. Because
so many different criminal justice actors play parts in producing the racial disparities reflected in jails,
participants strongly believed that these actors need to communicate with one another and work toward
common goals to achieve reform. As one participant stated, “It’s far too easy for a reform at stage one
of the system to be undone at a later stage unless we’re all sitting around the table together deciding
together what our goals should be and how we want to get there. Everyone needs to be on the same
page with what we are trying to do.”
A cross-departmental task force can set goals for the jurisdiction, recommend and consider changes to
practices of different departments, oversee the implementation of changes, and conduct periodic assessments.
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Participants identified four pillars of an effective task force.
Recruit Varied Members
Roundtable participants were vocal about the need for a variety of criminal justice actors with “decision
making authority” to sit on the task force. Suggestions for members included: senior and mid-level
representatives of the prosecutor’s office, probation office, and local sheriff’s office; a local judge, public
defender, community leader, and researcher or academic from a local institution. Other members could
include school officials, elected officials, victim advocates, or advocates for the formerly incarcerated.
A racial justice advocate emphasized, “The voices at the table need to be more than just perfunctory.
Advocates for community members should be included so that other stakeholders can get a better
understanding of how changes may affect the communities in question.”
Develop Outcome-Driven Strategies
The task force must clearly define its purpose and the outcomes sought. As a state advocate explained,
“Members must come up with their own strategies, their own understanding of racial disparities, and their
own ideas about solutions. By working together, they feel ownership over and buy into the goals.” One
corrections official explained, “A coherent, empowered collaborative team of system partners with deliberate,
guiding principles can identify particular practices that lead to racial disparities and work to reform them.”
Identify Specific Problematic Practices and Policies, and Recommend Reforms
The task force should conduct a comprehensive review of the local justice system to identify specific
practices and policies that drive racial disparities. These may include: disparate enforcement of petty
offenses, excessive stop-and-frisk tactics, revenue-driven enforcement of low-level offenses, or harsh bail
bond schedules that disproportionately affect communities of color. Because a task force cuts across
departments, it is well-suited to conduct the analysis of different policies.
One participant from law enforcement explained, “It is critical that jurisdictions have an explicit
dialogue about what policies need to change to get to the outcomes desired. That should happen before
implementation.” Another participant added, “Policy evaluation is important. A jurisdiction should
know, for example, if they are using citations instead of arrests and whether there are racial disparities
playing out in that practice. Conducting an evaluation of different policies facilitates that awareness.”
Once the task force identifies problematic policies, it should work with criminal justice agencies to
introduce changes. The task force can also help develop innovations in policy changes, seek ideas from
other jurisdictions, or consult national reform organizations or research groups.
Conduct Consistent, Periodic Assessments
Roundtable participants recommended that a task force meet periodically to assess whether recommended
changes are advancing the defined goals. This includes reviewing policies through measurable evidence, which
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holds the task force accountable. As one corrections official explained, “Successful collaboration requires
consistent communication and follow-up between task force members. Perhaps this can happen semiannually.” A participant who had served on a similar task force noted that assessments “keep people on task.”
Experience shows that coordination can help agencies achieve better outcomes than when they work
independently.

5.

•

A Roundtable participant in law enforcement pointed to the success of Greenville, N.C., as an
example. Police Chief Hassan Aden changed the culture of his department by inviting community
members to attend and participate in strategic planning meetings. The jointly-devised plan helped
reduce crime, increased community engagement, and increased economic development. The
number of citizen complaints against police plummeted almost immediately.106 The law enforcement
participant observed: “Inviting the community to places that they haven’t been before creates an
encouraging opportunity for change. What Greenville did can be replicated in other cities.”

•

In Cincinnati, Ohio, the police department, police union, and community leaders came together
to formulate and implement a Collaborative Agreement in 2002. Created in response to tension
between police and communities of color, the agreement focused on “problem-oriented policing.”
This strategy requires police and communities to jointly define the problems and determine how to
resolve them. The new strategy reduced crime and improved community relations.107

Require Training for All System Actors to Overcome Implicit Racial Bias

During the Roundtable, participants frequently emphasized the need for criminal justice actors to be
aware of their own unintentional biases. One representative from law enforcement explained, “We need
implicit bias training for all decision makers. This bias plays out at all decision points, and countering
it can change practices at all decision points.” Another participant urged: “Anyone who exercises
discretion in the justice system,” from police to prosecution to defense counsel, “should understand the
nuanced causes of disparities in their locality and the role that implicit bias may unintentionally play to
create or exacerbate those disparities.”
Implicit bias is a universal response by all people of all races.108 Encouragingly, studies show that when
people become aware of the potential for prejudice, they are usually willing to correct it.109 Providing
trainings to actors that explains implicit bias can help system actors become aware of their unconscious
prejudices and help them avoid acting upon those biases.
Participants identified two critical components of effective implicit bias trainings: the right substance
and the right people.
Rigorous Substance
Participants urged that implicit bias training include discussions of bias, decision making, and the
intersection between race and the criminal justice system. As one law enforcement representative
explained: “We need to have introductory conversations about race and the criminal justice system
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before getting in the weeds about implicit bias. If we don’t start with the recruits in the police academy
or their supervisors who demand that officers make 16 arrests today, outcomes will not change.”
Another law enforcement official agreed: “Decision makers don’t often get trained on how best to use
discretion. We need to train police on how to fire their weapon and how to drive their car. We also need
to train them to see how unconscious biases affect their own actions and thoughts and what steps to
take in order to address that.”
Participants across the board agreed that such trainings can help reduce the influence of racial bias at every
decision point, including police enforcement of offenses, prosecutorial charging practices, probation and
parole revocation proceedings, judicial sentencing determinations, and fees and fines collection.
The following jurisdictions were identified as successful models to consider:
•

Mecklenburg County, N.C., has a two-day training called “Dismantling Racism.” This intensive
workshop is co-hosted by the county’s collaborative leadership group on racial disparities in
juvenile justice and the Racial Equity Institute. Participants include criminal justice actors,
service providers, and community members including: educators, child welfare advocates, law
enforcement, and judicial representatives. The workshop provides tools to “understand[] and
eliminat[e] racial inequities, disparities and disproportionality within our society.”110 As a local
judge explained at the Roundtable, “The training addresses implicit bias, explains historical and
individual oppression, and talks about the neighborhoods where most offenders come from and
what pressures they face there. We then talked about how everybody in the room contributes
to racial disparities together — individually and collectively. My training had five to ten police
officers, five to ten school principals and administrators, five to ten court professionals, and five
district attorneys. And it really helped us. It provided a critical framework and a space for us to
understand racial bias without feeling attacked personally.”

•

Many jurisdictions, including Durham, N.C., Madison, Wisc., and Las Vegas, Nev., have
participated in the Fair and Impartial Policing training program. The program “trains officers on
the effect of implicit bias and gives them information and skills they need to reduce and manage
their biases.” It offers five separate curricula for different ranks of police — including academy
recruits and patrol officers, first-line supervisors, mid-managers, command-level personnel, and
law enforcement trainers — to better appreciate the nuances faced by each group. For example,
the supervisor training provides guidance on how to identify biases in decision making and
develop effective ways to speak about bias to the public and to the media.111

Involvement of all Actors
Several participants emphasized the importance of bringing the right people into the conversation.
A participant in law enforcement said, “Trainings are best led by someone who works within the
criminal justice system, ideally in that same jurisdiction. Otherwise, attendees may find the sessions
disconnected from their jurisdiction and their experiences, which may make them quicker to dismiss
the value of the training.”
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Since implicit bias may be a factor at every stage of the criminal justice process, Roundtable participants
recommended providing trainings to the full array of decision makers in the same session. There was
broad agreement that police officers, police administration, court personnel, emergency response teams,
probation officers, parole board members, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and correctional officers could
all benefit. A participant from the judiciary observed, “Implicit bias training provides a base understanding
and base language for actors to discuss race and racial disparities. It is amazing what has developed in
my jurisdiction once we all developed a base language to speak about this. It was very helpful to have
different actors in the same room talking about disparities to help us understand how biases played
out at different stages.” He urged that trainings include more than just criminal justice actors. As he
explained, “Incorporating the broadest scope of people possible ensures accountability across fields.” A law
enforcement official agreed: “We have to look at the big picture to see if other things need to be addressed.
That cannot happen unless and until all justice actors and the community gets involved.”

6.

Encourage Prosecutors to Prioritize Serious and Violent Offenses

Petty offenses are the primary gateway to the criminal justice system. Each year, more than 10 million
misdemeanor cases are filed, comprising almost 80 percent of state dockets.112 These offenses represent
the lion’s share of prosecutors’ and defenders’ caseloads, and half of probation officer cases.113 The almost
unmanageable case dockets in misdemeanor courts have caused prosecutors, judges, and even defense
attorneys to move defendants through the system with “almost like an assembly-line mentality.”114 This
practice can easily transform minor offenses into formal criminalization and jail time.115
Prosecutors retain vast discretion. They decide whether to charge an individual with a crime, what
charges to bring, and whether to negotiate a plea deal or continue to trial. That discretion can be used
to refocus prosecutorial practices. As mentioned in Part I, Roundtable participants emphasized that a
focus on enforcing low-level offenses helps fuel racial disparities while limiting the resources available
to address serious crimes. As one criminal justice advocate explained, “When we talk about the policies
and practices that are driving racial disparities in jail populations, it’s partly a question of decision
making by practitioners in the system, and it’s partly a question of resources and priority setting.”
Participants agreed that refocusing prosecutorial attention on serious and violent crimes would reduce
time in jail for those who may not need to be incarcerated. Many noted that the problem may be
rooted, in part, in a culture that conflates “success” with the number of prosecutions and convictions.
Participants urged a change to prosecutorial performance evaluations. As one local prosecutor explained,
“Measures of success for prosecutors must change. My jurisdiction does not consider an 80 percent
prosecution rate a good thing. We are proud of lower prosecution rates because it demonstrates that we
are being thoughtful about who needs to be prosecuted.” By shifting priorities and related incentives —
such as, for example, rewarding prosecutors for diverting low-level offenders from incarceration when
appropriate — prosecutors can play a pivotal role in reducing jail populations.116
Prosecutors are starting to agree that they can and should prioritize reducing violent and serious crime,
reducing incarceration, and reducing recidivism instead of focusing on increasing conviction rates and
sentence lengths. In 2014, the Brennan Center convened a Blue Ribbon Panel of current and former
federal prosecutors to devise new priorities for prosecutors.117 Though the Panel focused on how federal
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prosecutors can change practices, its recommendations also apply to local offices. It recommended that
prosecutor’s offices institute new priorities, including the primary goal of reducing violent and serious
crime. It also developed success measures to achieve these goals, including: changes in violent crime
rates, percent of serious and violent crime cases on office dockets, and percent of community reporting
feeling safe.118
Some local jurisdictions have experimented with shifting their office’s priorities:
•

The San Francisco District Attorney’s Office created Neighborhood Courts and Neighborhood
Prosecutors in 2011. Rather than face criminal prosecution, low-level misdemeanor defendants
face a panel of community residents serving as voluntary adjudicators. Citizens determine the
impact of a crime on the community and issue responses, such as community service or restitution.
Between 2011 and 2013, drug cases in San Francisco declined by almost 50 percent and the jail
population declined by almost 10 percent.119 The program contributed to this decline.

•

In 1998, the District Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn, N.Y., implemented Treatment Alternatives
for Dually Diagnosed Defendants (TADD). The program originally targeted offenders with
both mental health and substance abuse issues and later expanded to include those suffering
from a serious mental illness. To enter TADD, defendants were required to plead guilty and
participate in a rigorous treatment program.120

By diverting low level offenders, these offices can prioritize their resources to prosecute violent and
serious crimes. Applying this concept to local prosecutors’ offices generally will help reduce the jail
population and disparities while continuing to protect public safety.

7.

Increase Indigent Representation in Misdemeanor Offenses

Participants emphasized the need for access to meaningful indigent representation, particularly in
misdemeanor cases. Of the approximate 10 million misdemeanor cases filed annually, almost 25 percent
of defendants go before a judge without a lawyer.121 Theoretically, public defenders are guaranteed
for all cases where a criminal defendant faces a term of incarceration. Nevertheless, indigent counsel
is often denied due to court practices, overwhelming caseloads, or a lack of adequate government
resources for public defense.122
Roundtable participants agreed that decreasing misdemeanor convictions can significantly reduce jail
populations. Most defendants enter plea agreements for such low-level offenses. Access to counsel could play
a role in reducing these convictions. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
explained in a 2011 report, even simple misdemeanor cases can present complex legal questions that can
make a difference between innocence or guilt and incarceration or release. “Attentive defense counsel is
particularly important in misdemeanor courts,” the report noted, “because the volume of cases means that
prosecutors and judges too often and too easily can overlook factual issues.”123 With more than 95 percent
of cases resulting in plea agreements, securing representation before appearing in court is critical.124 And yet,
NACDL reported that in over three-quarters of counties defendants were appointed counsel in fewer than
20 percent of misdemeanor cases where jail time was an available punishment.125
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Legal scholar Alexandra Natapoff found that, without meaningful and adequate legal representation,
vulnerable people — including people suffering from substance abuse, people lacking basic literacy and
information processing skills, people with mental health problems, and the poor — are more likely to
plead guilty, regardless of innocence or guilt.126 Given these realities, the need for representation is critical.
Participants proposed three specific reforms to improve indigent defense in misdemeanor cases.
Provide Representation Earlier
Participants agreed that increasing access to indigent defense at the early stages of a case — such as at arraignments
and bail hearings — would reduce pressures to plead guilty. As a member of the defense bar explained, “If
you want to talk about disparity and its impact on society, you have to look at the impact of misdemeanor
convictions on people without lawyers in today’s ‘meet-and-plead’ justice system. Whether someone should be
released often comes up in plea bargaining — as in, if you plead guilty now you can go home, but if you don’t
then you will be incarcerated for at least five days. Defense attorneys can combat the effect that this has on case
disposition if they intervene at earlier stages.” A former local prosecutor agreed, noting, “Jurisdictions need to
allocate resources to defense, too. It’s critical to ensure that we have just outcomes.”
Enforce Case Load Limits
Recent litigation and statewide reforms have set caseload limits for local public defense offices. While
national standards limit felony cases to 150 a year per attorney, some public defense attorneys juggle
caseloads ranging from 500 to 800 a year. Such high volume makes it extremely difficult to perform
basic legal tasks to ensure clients receive quality representation.
One solution: caseload limitations. But Roundtable participants emphasized that these limits are not
effective unless rigorously enforced. Some jurisdictions have devised methods to enforce standards:
•

In Washington state, some counties implemented caseload guidelines and tied them to
funding for defense services. Those defenders offices received additional funding when their
total number of cases increased.127

•

In 2008 and 2009, the New Hampshire Public Defender entered into an agreement with the
state’s Judicial Council. The agreement required attorneys to maintain a maximum case load of
55 open and active cases.128 The Council provides accountability and an enforcement mechanism.

Collect Data and Allocate Resources
Roundtable participants cited a lack of data on how well public defenders achieved successful outcomes for
their clients. Some noted it would be valuable, in particular, to know the percent of indigent defendants
who have representation at early stages such as arraignment, and how that correlates to case outcomes.
Collecting relevant data and using it to inform resource allocation is key. As one local prosecutor
explained, “If we want the defense bar to do things differently, we’ve got to pour additional resources
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into it and change measurements. Defense counsel should not be measured based on how many cases
they process. Rather, they should be measured based on case outcomes. Did their services reduce jail
sentences? We need concrete data on this.”
Participants agreed that implementing reforms to indigent defense representation could reduce the
effects of law enforcement focusing on low level offenses, reduce pretrial detention, and reduce length
of sentences for low level offenses.

8.	Develop “Bench Cards” for Judges to Combat Implicit Bias and Reduce Unnecessary
Jail Usage
Bench cards are checklists that serve as reference guides for judges. Typically one-to-three pages long,
they explain the legal obligation of a judge and provide a list of questions for judges to use when making
decisions.
These documents include explicit, concrete criteria for decision-making, such as:
•

“Best Practices” Criteria: These list necessary components for specific hearings. The card may list
instances where defendants should have public defenders present, like a probation revocation
hearing. The card may also include reminders about the general process for specific hearings, such
as the circumstances necessary to accept waiver of counsel or hold someone in contempt of court.

•

Implicit Bias Questions: These provide judges with questions to reduce the effect of implicit
racial bias in decision making. For example, some checklists ask judges to “imagin[e] how one
would evaluate the [defendant] if he or she belonged to a different, non-stigmatized group.”
They also create strategies to control for implicit bias such as “if-then plans” to raise awareness
of potential bias in thinking. The questions are designed to “prompt decision makers to more
systematically reflect on and scrutinize the reasoning behind any decision for traces of possible
bias.” Such questions, of course, only make sense in tandem with implicit bias training.
Research suggests that judges who do not receive implicit bias training can actually increase
biases in decision making if prompted by such questions without proper understanding.129

•

List of Alternatives to Incarceration: These forms provide judges with a list of alternative
punishments other than incarceration for low-level offenses, like failure to pay court-imposed
fees or contempt of court. For example, it may explain how judges can convert community
service hours to account for unpaid court costs, or list impermissible methods of enforcement
for debt collection.130

Bench cards work well for judges who are susceptible to conditions in hearings that increase the
likelihood of implicit bias influencing their decisions. These include ambiguity making many decisions
in a short time, and distracting circumstances (including fatigue, backlogged or diverse caseloads)
that create time pressure and force judges to make complex decisions quickly.131 These circumstances
increase the likelihood that judges rely on stereotypes to make those decisions.
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Roundtable participants enthusiastically endorsed instituting bench cards for judges. A prosecutor
explained, “Checklists should inform, not replace, discretion. They help judges decide what to do
through a more orderly and self-aware process.” According to a member of the judiciary who uses bench
cards, “Specific research-based tools can mitigate implicit bias. Things like checklists, with their ‘check
your bias at the door’ internal reflection questions, are one of those tools. Bench cards are extremely
valuable for judges in court hearings.”
Participants pointed to several examples of successful bench card introduction:
•

In the juvenile context, several jurisdictions have implemented version of the Courts Catalyzing
Change Preliminary Protective Hearing Benchcard, including Los Angeles County, Omaha,
Neb., Portland, Ore., and Mecklenburg County, N.C. The cards prompt judges to consider
key questions regarding the appropriateness of foster care, factors that might prevent a child
from being sent home, and direct questions of reflection to make judges aware of biases in their
decision making process.

•

Similarly, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and Dependency Court
implemented bench cards for judges to help mitigate implicit bias in decisions where children
were placed in custody. Research shows that use of this card increased the likelihood that a
judge would place a child with a parent or relative as opposed to placing them in foster care.132

•

Ohio recently created bench cards to inform judges of their options for alternatives to
incarceration when a defendant does not pay court-imposed fees or fines.133 These alternatives
include community service, enforcement through civil judgment, and cancellation of debt.
Since the introduction of bench cards, there have been fewer complaints about indigent
defendants jailed because they could not afford to pay their debts.134

•

In DeKalb County, Ga., judges will start using bench cards to curb incarceration for failure
to pay criminal justice debt. This practice was instituted as part of a settlement in a federal
lawsuit that challenged the county’s debt collection practices. The cards specify the process that
judge’s should take to determine whether a probationer has the ability to pay criminal justice
debt. They also provide instructions for judges to preserve a defendant’s right to counsel during
hearings for failure to pay court debts.135

Roundtable participants proposed bench cards to address several issues highlighted in this report,
including tackling implicit racial bias and reducing jail populations. As one participant explained:
“Innovative reforms are sometimes as simple as implementing things we talked about or know work for
years. Sometimes it’s about common sense application.”
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Figure 5: Order Requiring Bench Cards in Dekalb County Recorder’s Court.136
DEKALB COUNTY COLLECTION OF FINES AND COURT FEES
All DeKalb County Recorder’s Court judges adjudicating misdemeanor probation revocation proceedings
shall abide by the described procedures:
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

ENFORCING FINES BY IMPOSING JAIL

All probationers have a right to counsel (which A probationer charged with failure to pay may be
may include a public defender or court-appointed jailed only if (s)he has willfully failed to pay or failed to
attorney) in probation revocation proceedings.
make reasonable efforts to acquire the resources to pay,
AND no adequate alternative to incarceration exists.
The court MAY NOT accept a written or oral waiver
of the right to counsel without FIRST informing the Prior to revoking probation and committing a
probationer of the dangers of proceeding without probationer to jail for nonpayment of fines, the court
counsel and ensuring that any waiver of the right to must conduct an economic ability-to-pay hearing.
counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
To conduct such a bearing, the court shall
If a probationer seeks to waive his right to counsel,
• Inquire and make a determination of
the court must conduct a colloquy on the record to
probationer’s ability to pay a fine, which
inform the probationer:
shall address the probationer’s ability to pay
• That the probationer has a right to a courtand the income, assets, debts, and financial
appointed attorney or public defender
responsibilities presented by the probationer;
at no cost, if he cannot afford to retain an
attorney;
• Inquire and make a determination of the
reasonableness of a probationer’s efforts
• That the $50 fee normally charged for
to acquire resources to pay a fine, which
representation by the DeKalb County
shall take into account efforts to secure
Public Defender may be waived for those
employment and borrow money, as well as
who cannot afford to pay;
limitations to the probationer’s ability to
secure employment and borrow money;
• Of the risks and dangers of proceeding
without counsel; including the risk of
incarceration and the maximum jail time
that may be imposed if the probationer is
determined to have violated probation; and

•

 f the benefits of representation by
O
counsel, including assistance with asserting
constitutional rights, preparing and
presenting financial hardship documentation
to the court, arguing in favor of alternatives
to incarceration, and vigorous advocacy
against the imposition of jail as punishment
for probation violation.

If, after being so informed, a probationer states a desire
to waive his right to counsel, the court must engage in
a colloquy and make a determination, supported by
findings of fact on the record and set forth in an order
that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Written waiver of the right to counsel on a
probation revocation petition or other document is
NOT ACCEPTABLE without such a colloquy and
findings of fact made on the record.
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• Consider and make a determination of the

adequacy of alternatives to incarceration,
including a reduction or waiver of fines
and fees, an extension of time to pay, and
community services in the event that a
probationer is determined to lack ability to
pay despite having made reasonable efforts to
acquire resources.

Each of the determinations shall be supported by
findings of fact on the record and set forth in a
written order.

CONCLUSION
Though reducing racial disparities in local justice systems is a challenging task, it is not impossible.
Roundtable participants universally shared a sense of optimism as they weighed a wide range of
solutions.
The eight recommendations set forth in this report are only a starting point for jurisdictions seeking
to meet the goals of reducing unnecessary incarceration and reducing racial and ethnic disparities. The
first step is to recognize that racial disparities exist, but are not necessary. Crime, incarceration, and
disparities can all be reduced together. The second step is action. Changes to state and federal laws are
vital. Changing local practices and individual decision making in local jurisdictions is also key. This
report seeks to provide a framework for local decision makers to achieve that goal.
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of specified serious crimes.26 Wiretaps had to be authorized by a judge or magistrate who would evaluate
whether there was probable cause to believe that one of these crimes had been, was being, or was about
to be committed.27 In keeping with the Katz footnote, however, Title III refrained from explicitly
regulating national security surveillance.28
2.

National Security Surveillance

In the 1972 case United States v. U.S. District Court (known as the “Keith” case after the district court
judge), the Supreme Court partially addressed the question that Katz and Title III avoided: it held that
surveillance of domestic organizations for national security purposes did require a warrant.29 But the
Court expressly left open — and has never ruled on — the question of whether a different rule might
apply if the government were seeking intelligence about a foreign power or its agent.
Keith involved three anti-war activists charged with participating in a conspiracy to destroy government
property. When the defendants sought to suppress evidence obtained through wiretaps, the government
argued that it was entitled to tap their phones without a warrant because it sought to “gather intelligence
information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack
and subvert the existing structure of the Government.”30 The Court rejected this argument, ruling that
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for surveillance “deemed necessary to protect the nation
from attempts of domestic organizations.”31 The opinion made clear, however, that the Court was not
passing judgment “on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of
foreign powers, within or without this country.”32
The Keith Court observed that national security cases “often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime. Though the investigative duty of the
executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected
speech” because the targets of official surveillance “may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
political beliefs.”33 Given the important separation of powers function historically served by warrants,
the Court held that executive officials charged with enforcing the laws should not also decide when to
employ “constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”34
Although it insisted on a warrant in domestic security cases, the Keith Court acknowledged that the
standards and procedures surrounding the warrant requirement “may vary according to the governmental
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”35 The Court thus invited
b r e nCongress
nan
to create special rules for domestic security surveillance. As examples, the Court suggested
facts might support a showing of “probable cause”; that the warrant application could,
c e n tthat
e different
r
“in sensitive cases,” be made to any member of a specially designated court; and that the duration and
f o r reporting
j u s trequirements
i c e could be less strict.36
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